We examine the relationship between prices and interest rates for seven advanced economies in the period up to 1913, emphasizing the UK. There is a signi…cant long-run positive relationship between prices and interest rates for the core commodity standard countries. Keynes (1930) labelled this positive relationship the 'Gibson Paradox'. A number of theories have been put forward as possible explanations of the Paradox but they do not …t the long-run pattern of the relationship. We …nd that a formal model in the spirit of Wicksell (1907) and Keynes (1930) o¤ers an explanation for the paradox: where the need to stabilise the banking sector's reserve ratio, in the presence of an uncertain 'natural' rate, can lead to persistent deviations of the market rate of interest from its 'natural'level and consequently long run swings in the price level.
1 Introduction "The 'Gibson Paradox' is one of the most completely established empirical facts within the whole …eld of quantitative economics."
J. M. Keynes (1930) "It is true that, in various countries and often for long periods of time, the movements of interest rates and commodity prices have been such as to suggest that they might be rationally related to one another in some direct and simple manner the exceptions to this appearance of relationship are so numerous and so glaring that they cannot be overlooked."
F. R. Macaulay (1938) The relationship between interest rates and prices, inter alia, lies at the heart of monetary theory. It is therefore no surprise to discover that a debate on what came to be known as the 'Gibson Paradox' played an important role in the development of theories of interest rate determination.
A number of important works in the early part of the twentieth century, most notably Wicksell (1907) , Fisher (1930) and Keynes (1930) , noted and o¤ered explanations for the positive association between the level of interest rates and of prices. However, as Macaulay (1938) says there has also been a healthy strain of opinion denying the very existence of the paradox. More recently another generation of researchers has re-discovered the paradox and o¤ered another set of explanations: Sargent (1972) ; Shiller and Siegel (1977) ; Benjamin and Kochin (1984) ; Friedman and Schwartz (1982) ; and Barsky and Summers (1988) . The long swings in prices were, of course, noted by non-monetary theorists such as Lewis (1954) who suggested that the longrun elasticity of labour supply meant that commodity prices returned to a long run trend. In this paper though we will assess the evidence for this In many ways the most attractive and simple explanation for the paradox is Irving Fisher's (1930) . He suggested that interest rates would rise to compensate bondholders for the expected devaluation of money over the holding period of the bond. We would therefore expect to …nd a positive relationship between expected in ‡ation and interest rates and to the extent that prices are positively correlated with expected in ‡ation we will …nd a Gibson paradox. 1 This explanation is consistent with the classical dichotomy by allowing the real interest rate to be independent of in ‡ation. To a great extent, intuition suggests that the Fisher explanation is likely to be a powerful reason for the continuing observation of the Gibson paradox in the period when in ‡ation rates became persistent i.e. at some point in the period following the …nal suspension of the Gold Standard. 1 In the period of …at money, the price level was positively correlated with in ‡ation until the disin ‡ation path adopted by advanced economies following OPEC II. From which time, of course, the price level and in ‡ation, and hence interest rates, have been negatively correlated. See Muscatelli and Spinelli (1996) for a discussion of this point. But along with Sargent (1972) we suspect that the existence of the paradox is unlikely to result from a Fisher-style story in the years prior to suspension of the Gold Standard in 1914. This is because the pattern of the association (see Figure 1 ) is essentially very long run. Sargent (1972) sums this point up well: "it is di¢ cult to accept both Fisher's explanation of the Gibson Paradox and to maintain that the extraordinary long lags in expectation are rational". In fact, Shiller and Siegel (1977) argue that as it is always possible to sum up long period changes in the price level to something that is essentially the price level, and therefore that the Fisher hypothesis is particularly prone to Type II errors. These points lead us to explore the relationship solely in the period of zero average in ‡ation (prior to 1914) and to explore as the most likely set of explanations that interest rates and prices are mutually determined within the context of a simple Wicksellian model in which the interplay between commercial banks'desired reserve ratios and deviations between the market and natural rate of interest set up interest rate and price dynamics corresponding to a Gibson paradox. 2 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the facts relating to the so-called Gibson Paradox. Section 3 argues that a theory of ‡uctuations is required to explain the paradox and …nds that the early theories of Wicksell (1907 and also 1898a and 1898b) and Keynes (1930) incorporated compelling (and testable) explanations for the Paradox. Section 4 constructs a new series of the reserve ratio and tests the Wicksellian theory in the frequency domain. Section 5 concludes and o¤ers some pointers to future work.
The Gibson Paradox

The International Evidence
This section outlines the characteristics of the relationship between the level of prices and the level of interest rates for seven countries. 3 We examine the association in the commodity standard period leading up to the end of the Classical Gold Standard in 1914. During the course of the twentieth century the price level starts to incorporate a permanent in ‡ation rate and hence the nominal interest rate rises to compensate bondholders for this permanent devaluation in the value of money: a Fisher e¤ect dominates all other possible explanations for the relationship in levels (see Barsky 1987 on this point).
2 See Bordo and Schwartz (1999) for a description of in ‡ation averages in the period prior to 1914.
3 Annex 1 outlines the sources of the data. there appears to be some positive association between interest rates and the log-level of prices. 4 The relationship appears to hold most consistently throughout the respective samples for the UK, Germany and Sweden:
countries that had almost uninterrupted adherence to commodity standards for the samples shown. 5 Of course, this does not imply necessarily that the 4 In each case the left-hand column corresponds to the nominal interest rates and the right-hand column to the log of the price level, where the price level is based to 1913=100 for every country. 5 The UK had a suspension of gold convertibility over 1797-1821. The German states had a bimetallic standard until the adoption of gold during uni…cation in 1871: there are no records of suspensions for the individual pre-uni…cation states. Germany did not suspend convertibility until 1914. Sweden was continuously on a silver standard from 1834 to the adoption of gold in 1873. See Bordo and Schwartz (1994) .
Gibson phenomenon is one peculiar to commodity standards but it seems clearer why previous researchers may have thought so.
For the US, the association appears strongest for the period following the peak in the prices in 1864 to the end of our sample. In France, the association breaks down most clearly during the …rst decade of the nineteenth century and the …rst commodity standard suspensions of 1848-50 rather than the later one of 1870-78. In Italy, we …nd that the association is clearest from 1872 through to some time in the mid-1890s. The Italian authorities had suspended metallic convertibility in 1866, adopted the gold standard in 1884 and suspended again in 1894. The association would then seem to correspond most closely to the period leading up and involving gold standard convertibility. Finally with the Spanish data we observe the pattern of (money,) interest rates and prices that Tooke (1844) had argued would support the Thornton-Ricardo view of a classic monetary shock: higher money, lower interest rates and higher prices. It turns out that the Spanish authorities had ended gold and silver convertibility in 1883 (the year our sample starts) and followed loose monetary and …scal policies until at least 1905. This simple plot of the long-run annual data would seem to suggest that there is a Gibson's paradox in the commodity standard period in need of explanation. For the rest of the paper we will con…ne our analysis to the Keynes-Wicksell position on this dataset.
The UK Experience
We explore in some more detail the relationship in the UK. There are simple data driven reasons for this, in terms of span and availability of a wide range of UK macroeconomic data. 6 Figures 1 and 3 suggest not only a long run 6 But we can also think of the UK as a member of a …xed exchange rate zone, with parities determined by the relative price of gold and silver. UK prices and interest rates therefore indicate reasonably well the pattern of prices and interest rates in other members of the implicit …xed exchange rate zone. Of course, the cost of shipping commodities meant that the exchange rate pegs operate with a degree of ‡exibility and the possibility of exit might lead to temporary deviations from common patterns. But as a …rst pass, common interest rates and prices are likely to be found, particularly over the long run.
pattern to the positive association between the interest rate on consols (and other instruments) and the price level, note for example the number of shortrun price cycles without corresponding movements in consol rates, but also that there were long periods of falling (I), rising (II) and then falling (III) prices. 7 We note the periods of falling prices correspond approximately to peace-time and the rising prices to wartime: the signi…cance of which is the implication for temporary government expenditures, which can be expected to raise both prices and interest rates (see Barro 1987 ). 8 1729-52 and 3% consol rate from 1753. Note that the other interest rates 7 The panels in Figure 3 correspond to I, II and III, respectively. shown are all short-term bills. Short-term government obligations called Exchequer Bills were issued from 1696, bore …xed interest, were assignable and matured after one year. 9 Neither consol rates nor Exchequer bill, as government obligations were subject to the Usury Laws and are considered a good indicator of the whole family of rates in the period up to 1833 (Ashton 1959, p87) . And Clapham (1944) states that the "last remnants of the Usury Laws were removed in 1854 they had not interfered with anyone since 1838 nor perceptibly with the Bank since 1833" (Volume II. p4). The Bank of England Bank Rate and the Discount rate on Prime Bills become increasingly the short-term reference interest rates as the nineteenth century bears on. And as such we …nd that their longer run movements are closely related to the long-term interest rate. 10 Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the UK. We …nd that the price level and both short-and long-term interest rates show very similar time series properties. The third column, the inverse of the coe¢ cient of variation, is indicative of the (inverse) probability of a turning point in the data and suggests that there is relatively little important cycling away in the very lower frequencies of the data. 11 We …nd signi…cant evidence of right-skewness in prices, the consol rate and the exchequer bill rate. Finally, consistent with column three, the data also suggest signi…cant leptokurtic behaviour, which implies a heightened likelihood of (business cycle) changes around the mean. Table 2 suggests important correlations contemporaneously and at leads and lags of up to …ve years for prices and each class of interest rates. 12 The 9 The source here is Parliamentary Papaers 1857-58, XXXIII (443) pp35-39, which gives annual data from 1696-1857. These securities were the favoured short-term investment instrument until the 1830s (see Gayer et al, 1953 ).
1 0 See Pressnell (1960) for further description of interest rates in this period. 1 1 This is because is we consider a variable following a Wiener process, the probability of a negative turning point is given by the area under the standard normal. A variable with a low mean relative to its standard deviation is intuitively likely to have more turning points. We formally examine the spectral density of the series in Section 4. 1 2 We examined the order of integration of the variables using Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and Sims'Bayesian tests. We conclude on the basis of these tests that the signi…cance of the tie-up across interest rates and through all sub-periods provides some evidence in favour of some common determinant of the price and interest rate process in the UK dataset.
In conclusion, we …nd evidence to suggest that there is a positive relationship between the level of interest rates and the log-level of prices.
The association is positive and seems closely related to the long run, or trend, movements in prices and interest rates. In the UK, this means that the association results from the downswing in prices and interest rates in the …rst half of the eighteenth century, from the long upswing in interest rates and prices of the latter-half of the eighteenth century and the long downswing that characterised the (long) nineteenth century. Finally, the association is found to be essentially persistent throughout the business cycle. The next section examines some of the reasons suggested for this association. explanations for the paradox in some detail. This is not only because of their historical interest. In contrast to many of the more recent explanations, both explained the relationship in terms of a general macroeconomic model.
In our discussion of the paradox and to facilitate comparisons with previous explanation it will be useful to reintroduce into the discussion the Wicksellian distinction, also used by Keynes, between the natural rate of possibility of stationarity in levels for at least one of the tests cannot be ruled out.
interest, the real rate of interest and the market (or, equivalently, loan) rate of interest. According to both Keynes and Wicksell the natural rate of interest is that rate at which saving equal investment, or alternatively that rate at which aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply. The only modi…cation we wish to make to this de…nition, to be able to incorporate more recent versions of macro models which distinguish between a short run upward sloping supply curve and a long run inelastic supply curve, is to add to the de…nition that it is that interest rate at which saving is equal to investment in long run equilibrium. The interest rate at which saving is equal to investment, but not necessarily in long run equilibrium is the real rate. And the market rate is the real rate plus anticipated in ‡ation -the Fisherian distinction.
Why did Wicksell and Keynes consider Gibson's observation to be a paradox? Wicksell was concerned with the question of how prices could be controlled by the banking system. In his analysis he considers a situation in which banks set the interest rate and supply the amount of money that is demanded, a situation in which "demand and supply of money have become about the same thing, the demand to a large extent creating its own supply." (p.215) If the interest rate is set below (above) the existing rate of pro…t, or as Wicksell called it "the natural rate of interest", prices rise (fall) because of the ensuing excess demand (supply) in the commodity market. Wicksell tells us that the proposition that a low rate of interest will raise prices and a high rate will lower prices "has been stated more than once, but a formidable objection was always triumphantly brought against it in the shape of statistical facts: high prices do not correspond with a low rate of interest, and, vice versa; it rather comes the opposite way, interest and prices often rising and falling together."(p.216) So Wicksell had to reconcile his theory that a low (high) rate of interest leads to rising (falling) prices and the observation that prices and interest rates move together.
He did so by arguing that "The rate of interest is never high or low in itself but only in relation to the pro…t which people can make...and this of course varies. In good times, when trade is brisk, the rate of pro…t is high, and, what is of great consequence, is generally expected to remain high; in periods of depression it is low, and expected to be low. The rate of interest on money follows, no doubt, the same course, but not at once, not of itself; it is, as it were, dragged after the rate of pro…t by the movement of prices and the consequent changes in the state of bank reserves, caused by the di¤erence between the two rates"(p.217). Bank reserves change because as prices rise (fall) the demand for money rises (falls), the supply of money follows, changing the reserve ratio of the banking establishment.
The solution to the Gibson paradox given by Keynes was to consider the transition from one equilibrium state to another. There are various elements to Keynes' explanation of the Gibson Paradox. The …rst element is the e¤ect of increases in the capital stock on the natural rate. He argues that the movements in the natural rate are long period movements "extending over decades" because "the annual increment in any year to the aggregate of capital is small relative to this aggregate..." (p.182). The change in the capital stock a¤ects the marginal e¢ ciency of capital or the pro…t rate, resulting in a shift of the investment function. This is Keynes before The General Theory, where changes in investment depend more on animal spirits than on the stock of capital. These changes in investment imply changes to the natural rate of interest. To re-equilibrate the commodity market, the real rate of interest has to change so as to be equal to the new natural rate.
However, the real rate, as measured by the yield on consols, is sticky. There is thus an excess supply or demand in the commodity market and prices change. As prices change the real rate starts catching up with the natural rate until we reach equilibrium. The explanation for the stickiness in the real rate given by Keynes is that "in London bank lending is not conducted wholly on the principles of a free market..." (p.182.). Presumably because of this market any excess demand or supply of loans does not a¤ect the interest rate in the short run and we observe quantity adjustments in bank lending rather than price adjustments.
Keynes'considers a possible objection to his explanation, namely, "that over longish periods the price level is governed by the supply of money... This long term explanation implies that as the capital stock increases over time the aggregate supply curve shifts to the right requiring a lower natural rate to equilibrate the commodity market. The excess supply of commodities results in a fall in prices. We can follow Keynes (1930) and assume that the market rate of interest adjusts slowly to the natural rate.
However, we would also observe the same relationship between prices and the interest rate if, following Keynes (1936) According to Wicksell the crucial link between prices and interest rates operates via bank reserves. Changes in these above (below) the desired level induce the changes in the market interest rate. Consider the situation after a rise in the natural rate due to a change in the pro…t rate. Prices start rising because of the excess demand for commodities, the demand for nominal money starts rising and so bank reserves start falling and the banks start raising the market rate. When the market rate reaches the new natural rate, prices stop rising. At this point bank reserves are still lower than they were at the beginning of the process. They are no longer falling but their level is lower than before. If banks do have a desired reserve ratio they will now raise the market rate above the natural rate. Prices will start falling and now reserves will start rising back towards the original level. When they reach that level banks may reduce the interest rate towards the natural rate.
There is overshooting of the market rate relative to the natural rate. This would not occur in Keynes'story. According to him banks can live happily with a wide range of reserves and can easily adjust to changes in reserves.
The second major di¤erence between Keynes and Wicksell concerns the e¤ects of an increase in gold, for example, because of a new discovery. The implication of Wicksell's theory is that such increases result in a decline in the market rate of interest because bank reserves would rise above their desired level. With the natural rate unchanged, prices would start rising, the reserve ratio would start falling and the market rate would start adjusting back to the natural rate. In Keynes' theory this would not happen as the new gold would be swallowed by the "natural gold hoarders"and would not result in a fall in the market rate of interest. 13 
Wicksell' s theory
Wicksell developed his theory of the relationship between the natural and the money rate of interest in response to the criticisms levied against the quantity theory by people like Tooke and Mill. (1898b, pp68-71). Many of these criticisms were based on the observation that most transactions were carried out with bank credit and other kinds of credit rather than money.
These various credit theories of prices rejected the notion that the quantity of money was of any importance. Wicksell developed his model to cope with both a monetary system in which actual money was used, 'a pure cash economy', and one in which actual money had been displaced by book entries in banks, 'a pure credit economy'(1898b, p.75). The similarity between the two is in the transmission mechanism.
According to Wicksell changes in the quantity of money a¤ect prices by …rst reducing the money interest rate and introducing a discrepancy between it and the real rate, or natural rate. It is this discrepancy that introduces disequilibrium in the commodities market between aggregate demand and supply and results in a change in prices. Similarly in a pure credit economy a change in the natural rate of interest, which according to Wicksell was highly variable, introduces a discrepancy between it and the bank interest rate and prices start changing. Prices will continue changing as long as banks maintain their interest rate below (above) the natural interest rate. In Wicksell's 'pure credit economy' there seems to be no economic reasons for the banks to change their interest rate in response to the rising (falling) prices generated by the discrepancy between the money and the natural rate. In this system banks do not hold cash reserves of any sort. However Wicksell's system and analysis can be easily formalised in a system in which banks hold some reserves in the form of cash. In such a system as we shall see the relationship between prices and interest rates -the Gibson Paradox -becomes more apparent.
A formal treatment
In this section, we present a formal exposition of the model presented in the previous section. Here a (mono)bank targets an optimal reserve ratio and any di¤erences between the natural rate of interest and the rate charged by banks for loans produces disequilibrium in the market for loans. This disequilibrium results in changes in the aggregate price level and a deviation in the reserve ratio from its optimum. The bank tends to move its loan rate to equal that of the (unobservable) 'natural'rate through a process of inspection and iteration and until the nominal quantity of loans is backed by a quantity of commodity money such that the optimal reserve ratio is obtained.
We …rst model the banking sector. Banks set interest rates so as to maximise pro…ts, , subject to the risk of non-convertibility, , or strictly speaking the risk of losing (gold) convertibility. Banks have the following mean-variance utility function:
Banks face a demand for loans expressed in real terms that depends on the interest rate for loanable funds (market interest rate), say, L (r) with .L 0 (:) 0 The demand for loans is speci…ed in real terms because loans are used to purchase units of investment (or consumption). Banks have costs that we shall assume are some varying percentage of loans, as so:
The risk of non-convertibility is measured by an inverse function of the reserve ratio, say:
The reserve ratio, R, is the inverse of the term in parentheses on the r.h.s. of (3), and we de…ne it as the ratio of the value of gold in reserves, G, to the nominal quantity of loans outstanding, P L (r).. We shall maintain this formulation throughout the rest of this paper. From (1), (2) and (3),
dU dr = u 1 0 (r) u 2 0 (r) = 0; and so (5)
From (3) and (2) we can write
And using (6), (7) and (8) 
This condition states that the bank will set its market interest rate so that the marginal risk of non-convertibility (the numerator of the r.h.s. of (9)) equals the marginal pro…ts from the loan book (the denominator). We can illustrate the equilibrium in Figure 4 . In the North-East quadrant we show a pro…t curve in space which is maximised at C: At that point risk of non-convertibility is relatively high, as is high and the market interest rate, r 0 is low relative to the natural rate of interest,r: In the same quadrant we show the indi¤erence curve representing utility function (1) . Note that We move on to analyse the macroeconomic implications of the adjustment process for prices and interest rates. Let:
represent the equilibrium relative prices of home and foreign prices (asterisk). Under convertibility, e is …xed and so we normalise to 1. So that when P 6 = tP domestic bank reserves will change. Thus:
From (12)
Now let z = and so we have
Hence the price level will adjust (cycle) to that level implied by (10) and in the process of adjustment interest rates will converge on the 'natural' interest rate and the reserve ratio will tend to its optimal level. Note that because the price level must return to its original level, tP , and so interest rates will have to not only to move to the 'natural'rate for a period overshoot their equilibrium in order to bring the price level back to its initial level.
The comparative statics are:
Case 1 Natural rate shifts
The market rates moves gradually up (down) to the 'natural' rate.
During which time loan disequilibrium leads to excess investment (saving) and increases (decreases) in the aggregate price level. Prices cease to move when the loan rate equals the 'natural' rate but because the reserve ratio is below (above) its optimal level, loan rates will temporarily overshoot the equilibrium so that prices fall (increase) to their original level. Here prices and market rates will be positively associated at the lower end of the frequency spectrum.
Case 2 Gold shock
A positive (negative) gold shock will reduce (increase) the reserve ratio and lead to an expansion (contraction) of the nominal loan portfolio. This implies that market interest rates will temporarily fall (rise) and the price level will rise (fall) permanently to a new level. Here prices and market rates will be positively associated at in the …nal part of the adjustment of interest rates back to the natural rate: that is at higher frequencies.
Case 3 Change in equilibrium relative price
Lower (higher) domestic prices than equilibrium imply excess domestic demand and domestic prices must adjust to the higher (lower) foreign price level. As there can be no change in the reserve ratio the quantity of loans must fall (rise) and this is instituted by a temporary increase in the market rate. Here prices and market rates will be positively associated in the …rst part of the adjustment of interest rates away from the natural rate: that is at higher frequencies.
Empirical Tests
The model developed in Section 3 allow us to consider a tests of the relationships between interest rates, prices and the reserve ratio. We use spectral analysis so we can decompose the variance in each time series into cycles corresponding to di¤erent frequencies running from the lowest frequency -the time span of the data -to the highest -in this case annual.
One we obtain the spectral density of each series we can calculate the cospectra.
A Spectral Test
We can de…ne the cross-spectrum between two series as:
with the corresponding integrated spectral function W (a) de…ned over the range 0 to . Solving for the cross correlation we …nd that
In a univariate setting the sin terms cancel as k = k and the spectral density is real. But now we have:
From (18) we can see that the cross-spectra has an imaginary and real component. The …rst two terms on the right hand side, c ( ), are the cospectra and the …nal term, q ( ), is the spectral density. The sum of the squares of these two terms is the amplitude, which when standardised by the spectral densities of each separate series, $ i ( ), is called the coherence:
The coherence measures the degree to which the series vary together and can be thought of as the squared correlation coe¢ cient. The gain diagram plots ordinate R 2 12 ( ) against as abscissa, where
The gain is analogous to a regression coe¢ cient. Finally, the phase diagram plots ( ) as against as abscissa, with the phase measuring the lead or lag in the relationship at each frequency:
Figures 5-7 show the (i) coherence is the squared correlation coe¢ cient at each frequency, (ii) the gain and (iii) the phase as a fraction of the cycle by which one series leads (lags) the other for prices and interest rates and then each against the 'target'variable in a partial-reserve commodity standard:
the 'optimal'reserve ratio. 14 Figure 5 suggests clear coherence at the trend frequency between interest rates and prices and at the higher frequency end of the business cycle: about 18 months. The gain statistic is most powerful at the high business cycle frequency and suggests the existence of a short cycle relationship between interest rates and prices. But note that at these signi…cant horizons the relationship is essentially unlagged and therefore likely to be related to some common shock -'natural' rate shocks for the low frequency coherence and gold and foreign price shocks for the higher frequency coherence.
What is the connection between interest rates and prices and our measured reserve ratio? 15 Figure 6 …nds …nd important coherences at the trend and longer business cycle frequencies (2-3 years) and note that the gain is highest at the trend. We also …nd that prices lag the reserve ratio quite prominently. Figure 7 paints a very similar picture in terms of coherences and gain between interest rates and the reserve ratio, with peaks at …ve years, two years and one year, but …nds at the lower frequency peak that interest rates lag the reserve ratio and at higher frequency peaks leads the reserve ratio. We interpret these results as providing corroboration of the importance of longer run movements in the interest rates and prices as resulting from deviations of the reserve ratio from its desired level. But that the important switch at shorter horizons provides some evidence for the role also played by shorter run adjustment to gold shocks and foreign 1 4 The spectrum decomposes the time series into its constituent cycles from the lowest (212 years, …rst vertical line) to the highest frequency of the data (one-year, third vertical line). Note that the middle vertical line corresponds to a frequency of two years. The coherence is bounded between 0 and 1 and signi…cance is tested by test statistic distributed as F (2,2(n-1)), which for this data size suggests coherence over 0.4 is signi…cant (see Koopmans (1995) 
A Time Series Test
We investigate the issue a little further with the help of an identi…ed vector autoregression (VAR). Following Koop et al (1996) we estimate generalised impulse response functions within the context of a multivariate time series model. We use a generalised identi…cation rather than orthogonal because over the course of a year, our frequency of measurement, we do not think that it makes sense to think about which variable leads which other. The generalised function allows us to think about the response of a variable to a generalised residual in the any of the VAR's equations.
i z t i + w t + u t ; t = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
where z t is an m 1 vector of jointly determined dependent variables, w t is a q 1 vector of exogenous variables and the m 1 vector of disturbances satisfy standard criteria. Given that the VAR is stable, all the roots of the determinantal equation will lie outside the unit circle, the moving average representation of (23) can be employed:
where matrices, A j and B j , are computed recursively. The generalised impulse response function for a system-wide shock, u 0 t , is de…ned by:
where E (:j:) is the mathematical conditional expectation with respect to the VAR model and 0 t 1 is the realisation of the process at time t 1. And when the VAR has a moving average representation we have:
For a given set of exogenous variables, if the VAR model is perturbed by a shock, i = 2 p ii , to the ith equation at time t. The de…nition of the generalised impulse response allows us to write:
ii ; i; j = 1; 2; : : : ; m;
where e is the m 1 selection vector and the generalised impulse response function of a unit shock to the ith equation in the VAR on the jth variable at horizon N is given by the jth element. to the reserve ratio and equilibration is measured in decades. When the reserve ratio is temporarily shocked into surplus the market rate slowly falls as does the price level over a period of four years. The consol rate then starts to return slowly to the long run level, equivalent to the unobserved 'natural' rate, the half-life of which is a further eleven years. The price level shows evidence of cycling slowly back to its long run level. 16 One …nal point the reserve ratio shows considerably less persistence than the other two variables but seems closely (and inversely) related to the long run pattern of ‡uctuations in the consol rate and the price level. 17 Given there are several regime changes and temporary, yet persistent shocks, induced by war -the most prominent example being the suspension of convertibility in 1797 -we may consider it necessary to model these events as well but the overall statistical properties of the VAR do not suggest the need for sub-sampling and so tentatively, at least we do think these results are at least consistent with the Wicksellian version of events. 18 
Concluding Remarks
Over the two hundred years for which we have data, the British economy has been subjected to a whole variety of shocks: wars and famines, gold and silver discoveries, changes in monetary regimes, the industrial revolution and many others (see Crafts, 1985 ). Yet over this whole period the relationship between interest rates and prices, the Gibson Paradox, seems to have persisted. As Keynes put it "It is very unlikely indeed that it can be fortuitous, and it ought, therefore, to be susceptible of some explanation of a general character." (1930, p.179). Explanations o¤ered include causality running from prices to interest rates via wealth e¤ects (Shiller and Siegel, 1977) , or from interest rate to prices via excess supply of money (Barsky and Summers (1988) ).
Over this period wealth was changing for all sorts of reasons: there was growth of capital, population changes and the discovery of new technologies.
It seems likely that the wealth e¤ects arising from an unanticipated rise in and price level and -0.39 and -0.29 between the reserve ratio and consol rate and the price level, respectively. 1 7 Qualitatively similar results are available for the sets of short run rates. We ran a fourth order VAR having tested for lag length using Akaike information criteria, sequential log likelihood and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion. We are able to reject at the 5% that each of the three variables do not block Granger cause the other two variables. Full test results are available on request. 1 8 We plan to study the suspension of convertibility period in future work.
prices might be swamped by the real changes occurring over this period.
Similarly, the excess supply of money over this period would be a¤ected on the supply side by gold and silver discoveries and changes in monetary regimes and on the demand side by changes in real income. Any interest rate e¤ect on gold hoards and on the demand for money would be second order its e¤ects would be unlikely to dominate everything else. If our stylised fact is right then, as conceded by Friedman and Schwartz then, "all that is required is that real disturbances that tend to raise nominal rates should also tend to raise prices; and real disturbances that tend to raise prices should also tend to raise interest rates (p565)".
What we …nd likely, prompted by Wicksell and Keynes, is that the need to maintain commodity convertibility lay at the heart of the Gibson paradox. The banking sector needed to maintain a given reserve ratio but, in the face of both persistent and temporary shocks to the economy's 'natural' rate, would only gradually move the 'market' interest rates to levels where neither prices nor the reserve ratio would then move. The insight of Wicksell, and to an extent Keynes, was to realise that in a monetary economy, real disturbances were more than likely to have signi…cant monetary consequences -it is an insight that has arguably not yet been fully appreciated. (a) we use log-level for prices and levels for interest rates; b) * and ** indicates significant difference from zero at 5% and 1% respectively; c) Discount on prime bank bill series is from 1800, the Bank rate from 1797 and the Exchequer Bill series until 1856. 
